{"id":1642,"date":"2017-11-28T08:08:01","date_gmt":"2017-11-28T08:08:01","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.dekuzu.com\/en\/?p=1642"},"modified":"2017-11-28T08:08:01","modified_gmt":"2017-11-28T08:08:01","slug":"bmis-answer-to-dojs-appeal-on-full-work-licencing","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.dekuzu.com\/en\/2017\/11\/bmis-answer-to-dojs-appeal-on-full-work-licencing.html","title":{"rendered":"BMI\u2019s answer to DOJ\u2019s appeal on full-work licencing"},"content":{"rendered":"<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: 'times new roman', times, serif; font-size: 14pt;\">This appeal presents a single question: does BMI\u2019s Consent Decree prohibit BMI from licensing a fractional interest in the public performance right to a musical work (commonly referred to as \u201cfractional licensing\u201d), when BMI does not control the entirety of the public performance right for that musical work? As demonstrated below, the <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dekuzu.com\/en\/docs\/BMI_Appellate_Brief_DOJ_Full-work_licensing.pdf\">answer<\/a> to this question is no.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><!--more--><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: 'times new roman', times, serif; font-size: 14pt;\">If the government were correct that works in which BMI has only a fractional interest of the performance right are not part of the repertory, such works would not fall within the requirement that BMI license all works in its repertory to all music users or, indeed, under any other provision of the decree. The correct conclusion to be drawn from two premises (1) the repertory includes only works that BMI has the right to license on a full-work basis, and does not include works that BMI may license only on a fractional basis; 2) the decree requires BMI to license all works in its repertory to all music users.) would be that the licensing of fractional interests are unregulated rather than prohibited. The licensing of such works would be neither prohibited nor required.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: 'times new roman', times, serif; font-size: 14pt;\">Defying the clear logic of its own premises, the Government concludes that because the fractional interests are not (in its view) part of the repertory, BMI is prohibited from offering fractional interests to music users. This conclusion is a complete non-sequitur. The Government argues that \u201cthe right of public performance\u201d can only be understood to mean a single, complete right. That is not so. The use of the definite article \u201cthe\u201d in \u201cthe right of public performance\u201d is used to describe the particular type of right that is being granted or licensed, not to connote that it is a complete right. Were the Government\u2019s position adopted, songwriters who wished to control the licensing of their interests in performance rights might be forced to choose their collaborators based on PRO affiliation rather than creative chemistry.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: 'times new roman', times, serif; font-size: 14pt;\">The purported express requirement in the decree that BMI license works in its repertory on a full-work basis, without any indication that this is the only basis on which BMI may license, does not create an unwritten implied prohibition on licensing fractional interests which are, by the Government\u2019s logic, excluded from the BMI repertory. A requirement to do X does not, without more, constitute a prohibition on doing Y, unless Y is the precise converse of X. Licensing fractional interests \u2013 where BMI has no ability to license the whole \u2013 is not contrary to a requirement that BMI license on a full-work basis when it is able to; it is additive. BMI offers all of the interests it represents, both full-work and fractional.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: 'times new roman', times, serif; font-size: 14pt;\">Had the parties wished to limit the scope of the repertory to include only works for which BMI could grant a full right of public performance, they could have included the scope of the particularized right in the definition. Specifically, the parties could have defined the BMI repertory in Article II(C) to mean \u201c(<strong>only<\/strong>) those compositions, the (<strong>full<\/strong>) right of public performance of which BMI has or hereafter shall have the right to license or sublicense.\u201d They did not, thus leaving open the possibility that BMI include in its repertory works for which it can license the full right of public performance as well as works for which it holds only a fraction of the right of public performance.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: 'times new roman', times, serif; font-size: 14pt;\">In CBS, the Court held only that the issuance of blanket licenses is not per se unlawful and instead, \u201cwhen attacked\u201d under the antitrust laws, the blanket license \u201cshould be subjected to a more discriminating examination under the rule of reason.\u201d The court rejected CBS\u2019s argument that copyright owners would hold out for \u201cunconscionably high fees,\u201d thereby making direct licensing impossible. The court affirmed conclusion that \u201chold ups\u201d are \u201cnot a consequence of the blanket license.\u201d Neither the BMI nor the ASCAP rate court has ever set a rate accounting for royalties to be paid to the other PRO\u2019s affiliates on account of their interests in split works.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>This appeal presents a single question: does BMI\u2019s Consent Decree prohibit BMI from licensing a fractional interest in the public performance right to a musical work (commonly referred to as \u201cfractional licensing\u201d), when BMI does not control the entirety of<\/p>\n<div class=\"more-link-wrapper\"><a class=\"more-link\" href=\"https:\/\/www.dekuzu.com\/en\/2017\/11\/bmis-answer-to-dojs-appeal-on-full-work-licencing.html\">Continue reading<span class=\"screen-reader-text\">BMI\u2019s answer to DOJ\u2019s appeal on full-work licencing<\/span><\/a><\/div>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[12,3,14,5,6,18,17,16],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1642","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-cmo-rules","category-collective-management","category-competition","category-copyright","category-intellectual-property","category-law","category-litigation","category-royalties","entry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.dekuzu.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1642","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.dekuzu.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.dekuzu.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.dekuzu.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.dekuzu.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1642"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.dekuzu.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1642\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.dekuzu.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1642"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.dekuzu.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1642"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.dekuzu.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1642"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}